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Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER PROUDHON

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"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."
John Hay.

On Picket Duty.

I'm not saying a word.—*Chas. A. Dana.*

English domestic servants have been holding a demonstration in Hyde Park and airing their grievances. They complain of many injustices, particularly of the lack of air and ventilation in their rooms. What is to be done for them? A London paper suggests legislation analogous to the factory acts. By all means, let us have inspectors visiting houses and interfering with domestic arrangements. A few may get kicked out, but a lesson in government will have been given.

The Peter Paul Book Company of Buffalo, N. Y., has issued a pamphlet of ninety-six pages which ought to be read by thousands. It is entitled "Hans Glouck vs. William McKinley and Others." It does not bear the name of the author, but those who read Liberty in its early days or who are familiar with the radical literature of the last thirty years will recognize at once the pen that wrote it, and fall, as of old, under its irresistible charm. It is a notable contribution to the literature of the campaign, and is strongly Anarchistic in its tendencies.

With the recent adoption by the "Age of Thought" of the new typography, the specifically Anarchistic press of the United States became a solid phalanx in opposition to justification, either by faith or by spaces. Now even the Communistic press is becoming tainted with the dangerous heresy, the "Firebrand" having joined our little army of the ragged edge. With "Egoism," the "Age of Thought," the "Firebrand," and Liberty blazing the way, perhaps "Lucifer" ere long will pick up courage. Or does it desire to become conspicuous as a typographical mossback?

Perhaps nothing indicates more strikingly the strength of the silver movement than the sudden and unexpected conversion of some of the most venomous and rabid gold-bug organs to the gospel of toleration and moderation. The nomination of Bryan on the "revolutionary" platform was a signal for an outbreak of press hysterics. The epithets "lunatic," "crank," and "ignoramus" were rejected as too mild for the emergency. The silver people were to be known thereafter as pirates, revolutionists, secessionists, repudiators, scoundrels, swindlers, and cut-throats. For a week this policy of furious denunciation and reckless abuse was kept up, each organ of the brotherhood of thieves trying to outdo all the rest. Then, with significant abruptness, a considerable portion of the organs changed their tone and method. The readers opened their morning papers, expecting to find the same shrieks, howls, and gall in the editorial columns, but, to their great amazement, appeals and more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger sort of pleading had been substituted. It had been discovered that the silver people are as honest and patriotic as the gold worshippers, and that their "error" was mental rather than moral. The one great need, therefore, was "education," while abuse and invective were to be deprecated as wrong as well as inexpedient. The New York "Evening Post," one of the chief offenders, and the inventor of the application of the term "blatherskite" to political discussion, turned a somersault, and admonished the "sound money" men that "they must not stand off and call the people who now incline to favor free coinage Anarchists, blatherskites, or fools," but must recognize that they are well-meaning citizens, who, though deluded, "can be informed and converted." A dozen other prominent papers followed suit, and now "the order of the day" is "education" and "dispassionate discussion." How long this mood will last is uncertain, but the repentant organs must be congratulated on their acumen and self-restraint. Of course, the rascally New York "Sun" is an exception. It has not changed and cannot change. But its desperation and fury are among the factors which silver relies on for victory. Let it rage and foam at the mouth; the revolt against the brotherhood will be strengthened by its Bourbonism and incendiarism.

The little pamphlet by Charles A. Dana which I have published since the issue of the last number of Liberty, but of which most of my readers already know through the notice that it has received from the public press, is not only of great interest, but of greater importance. The appearance of a really intelligent, forceful, and sympathetic exposition of mutual banking by so famous (though infamous) a man as Dana cannot fail either to convince many thinking readers by the weight of its arguments or to draw the attention of multitudes to the Anarchistic solution of the financial question at a time when that question is practically monopolizing the thought of the entire nation. The fact that it unmasks a diabolical hypocrite, though in itself an achievement not to be estimated lightly, is the least of this pamphlet's virtues. For these reasons I hope that all friends of liberty will make the most of the opportunity for the circulation of the pamphlet which the political campaign offers. Many of my readers have already done much to help by inquiring for the pamphlet at all the bookstores and news-stands within their reach, and as a result a demand is springing up all over the country through the regular channels of the book trade. Let all those who have not already done this follow promptly the excellent example of those who have. Whoever can afford to do so should place an order for a single copy with each book and news dealer that he can visit, using the copies thus obtained for distribution among those who probably would not see the pamphlet otherwise. But no one for whom this would be too great an expense should be deterred by that consideration from making a tour of inquiry. To merely ask to see a book serves to stimulate the dealer's interest, and a succession of inquiries will generally induce him to order a supply of his jobber. Among my readers there are several commercial travellers who, visiting town after town as they do, have great opportunities in this line of work, which they promise to utilize to the fullest. Comrade Fulton, too, is doing nobly by the little book in the columns of his "Age of Thought," and I take this opportunity to suggest to Comrade Cohen that he can do nothing better for the success of his timely and energetic efforts in behalf of Col. Greene's "Mutual Banking" than to circulate Dana's "Proudhon and His Bank of the People" as a sort of John the Baptist, notwithstanding his somewhat amusing alarm lest my typographical eccentricities may bring ruin upon the good cause. The daily newspapers, sure to notice anything that has a sensational side, are doing much for the pamphlet. The New York "Journal" started the ball with a column leader, and long articles have appeared also in the Washington "Post," the Springfield "Republican," the San Francisco "Call," the Mobile "Register," the New Bedford "Standard," the Pittsburg "Commoner and Glass Worker," and other newspapers. Some journals, it is true, hesitate to notice it, and for various reasons; one thinks it bad politics, another fears Dana, and a third keeps silence through *esprit de corps*. Others, on the contrary, are only too glad of an opportunity to put the knife into the vitals of an old enemy and turn it vigorously round, still others see a chance to satisfy their love of fun, and a third but smaller class, of which the New Bedford "Standard" is a striking example, manifest a real and graver interest in the deeper purport of the book. Between them all, the work goes bravely on.

Liberty.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — PROUDHON.

☞ The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Mr. Shaw's Defence of Public Enterprise.

I.

Mr. Shaw is a dangerous opponent, and I have no doubt that he is well aware of the fact. He knows human nature (or he would not make so admirable a dramatic critic), and his controversial methods are eminently calculated to insure his ephemeral success with the average audience. He is brilliant, paradoxical, audacious, witty, and interesting. The average man or gathering is bored by argument or systematic reasoning, and turns with delight to the speaker who throws logic to the winds and displays what may be termed intellectual unscrupulousness. Still, the impression produced is not lasting, and the audience goes away pleased and grateful for a refreshing half-hour, but unconvinced.

The appeal Mr. Shaw addresses to Liberty to throw its principles overboard and become "free" at last, for the sake of the exciting and sensational scandal of it, is a characteristic Shawesque paradox, and his opening assertion that he is a master of logic and consistency, while I am merely their slave, is another brilliant, but meaningless, point. Does Mr. Shaw imply that he has no use for logic or consistency, and that he can defy them without injury to his argument? He really means to say, simply, that my charge of illogicality and inconsistency is not warranted, and that the offence against reason is on my side rather than on his. This manner of putting it is prosaic and unimpressive, while Mr. Shaw's, though utterly absurd, is startling and attractive. By showing that a writer is inconsistent and illogical you really discredit his position, unless he can prove (and proof implies logical reasoning again) that his inconsistency and apparent lack of logic are rendered necessary by a broader and higher principle or generalization than that to which you appeal. For instance, when Mr. Tucker says that it would be inexpedient to enforce certain classes of just contracts, he meets the charge of inconsistency by arguing that equal freedom is not an absolute law of social life, but only a safe general principle which admits of some exceptions. One may disagree with him, but the charge of inconsistency is disposed of. Suppose, however, he should insist in one breath that equal freedom *is* an absolute law, and declare in the next breath that certain just contracts should not be enforced: every logical reader would rightly vote him inconsistent and illogical, and I doubt whether Mr. Shaw himself would spring to his defence by exclaiming: "Nonsense, what do we care for consistency or logic? We should be masters of these things, not slaves of them."

Again, when Mr. Shaw calls upon Mr. Tucker to throw his principles overboard and emancipate himself, he is not to be taken seriously. He simply implies that Mr. Tucker's principles are unsound, and that the Fabian philosophy is more rational and scientific. No reasoning being rejects principles; even the most confirmed "slaves" of common sense are governed by certain general principles, although they may not be able to name them.

Having illustrated Mr. Shaw's fallacious and misleading method, let me consider his "random observations" in reply to my criticism. My rejoinder must necessarily be as fragmentary and unsystematic as Mr. Shaw's reply. I am afraid I am a "slave" to system, and do not share Mr. Shaw's preference for the Nietzsche paragraphic or newspaper treatment of important social questions.

Mr. Shaw tells us that he does advocate, not only municipal theatres, but municipal religion, municipal newspapers and magazines, and municipal books on philosophy, economics, and politics. He does this, not for the sake of consistency, but because in each case common sense tells him that the thing is necessary and desirable. I, on the other hand, condemn these undertakings, not only from the standpoint of principle, which I deem the surest and safest guide, but because I find them undesirable and mischievous in the concrete. American churches are not municipalized, yet they are doubtless better run and kept than the churches of Italy. The schools, universities, hospitals, and charitable institutions supported entirely by private enterprise are everywhere incomparably superior to those supported by the municipality; while municipal newspapers are published for special purposes which private enterprise does not find it profitable to subserve. I am familiar with the United States "Congressional Record" and some local advertising municipal sheets, but that any comparison can be instituted between them and the great private newspapers has never occurred to me. I am not going to ask where Mr. Shaw was born, where he lives, how old he is, and what he reads, for I know that one may be the son of respectable and worthy parents, live in a great city, be old enough to know better, and read fifty papers a day, and yet talk or write in a way that will upset all the prevalent notions of the effect of culture, observation, and education.

Thus Mr. Shaw's surprise at my remark that private enterprise has never begged to be protected from the competition of public enterprise would warrant my asking him whether he has read the passage he so severely animadverts upon. "Nothing else occurs," he says, "when the question is raised," and he adds that the big instances of begging for protection are "notorious, gross, palpable to all the world." But Mr. Shaw has inexcusably failed to grasp the real meaning of my remark. In saying that no begging for protection "has ever occurred," I emphasized the important distinction between protection from competition and protection from monopoly. The next sentence to that quoted by Mr. Shaw reads: "Private enterprise has protested against *monopoly* which fraudulently parades as competition." I now italicize the word "monopoly," since Mr. Shaw, with all his acuteness, totally overlooked the emphasis and the distinction. The "notorious, gross, and palpable instances" to which he refers are perfectly well known to me, but I see in them, not cases of appeal for protection against public competition, but cases of protest against public monopoly fraudulently parading as competition. Which interpretation is correct is another question, but to any logical mind the difference between ignoring or denying the existence of certain notorious matters, and putting a different interpretation upon them, must seem of great consequence.

To further elucidate my distinction, I pointed out that, since public enterprise invariably rests on compulsory taxation, it never competes on an equal footing with private enterprise. How does Mr. Shaw deal with this fact? He attempts to make three points. First, he says that it is of the very essence of competition that one of the competitors should have some advantage over the others, and that he should win by virtue of this advantage. Very true, but everything depends on the *character* of the advantage. Suppose one competitor begins by robbing another of his goods. This would be an advantage, but not of a kind permitted or tolerated. The advantage must be due to natural superiority, and the field must remain as fair and free as before. Secondly, Mr. Shaw declares that my notion of fair competition is that all competitors should be handicapped until they are all equally fit, which means that competition is really done away with. But Mr. Shaw is mistaken. I believe in the survival of the fittest under equal freedom, and this implies no handicapping of any competitors. Natural inequality of ability is to be given free play within the limits of equality of liberty, and no competitor is to be interfered with so long as he does not resort to force or invasion as a means of downing his rivals. Surely Mr. Shaw does not intend that the enforcement of equal liberty is a handicap, and surely he must realize that within the limits thus imposed there are plenty of opportunities for natural differences of skill and capacity to assert themselves! To affirm that under equal freedom competition can produce no effect whatever is to imply that, without murder, robbery, or some other form of aggression, no man can distance his competitors,—which would be absurd. Mr. Shaw has succeeded as a dramatic critic without killing or maiming rival applicants for his job; without violating equal freedom, he can survive as a critic by virtue of his special natural gifts. What is true of critics is equally true of shop-keepers, bakers, tailors, editors, and theatrical managers.

Mr. Shaw's third point is that voluntary taxation is impossible, and does not exist even in the sphere of private competitive enterprise.

There is no sense, according to his logic, in complaining of compulsory taxation by the State, when, as a matter of fact, private enterprise also obtains its capital by compulsory taxation. Here is Mr. Shaw's language:

> But, pray, how does private enterprise raise its capital? Is it voluntarily subscribed by the men and women whose labor produces it? Not a bit of it. Some of it will be collected in the first instance as rent from the workers whose labor has earned it, the collection being made compulsory by the State, which enforces the proprietary right of the landlord to his rent by exactly the same means as it enforces the demands of the tax collector. Some of it will never reach the workers at all, but will be withdrawn as rent of capital from the pile paid by the public for the goods or services of a trading company before any worker, from the manager to the porter, receives a penny. And this subtraction is also made compulsory by State force.

And Mr. Shaw proceeds to show that the compulsion of private enterprise is much worse than that of the most corrupt government, because the latter is forced to give some value for the taxes collected, while the former levies its tax with the avowed intention of spending it on itself.

All this argumentation would be very effective and relevant, if directed against the defenders of the *status quo*, against the champions of capitalism and privilege and State-supported monopoly. The Liberty and Property Defence League, for example, would doubtless be at a loss to find a satisfactory answer to Mr. Shaw's taunt. But it is altogether irrelevant and forceless when raised in a discussion with one whose postulate is equality of liberty. Equal liberty condemns alike the present system of State-protected monopoly and Mr. Shaw's State Socialism. When Mr. Shaw tells us, virtually, that the present semi-individualistic system is even worse than his scheme, we silence him by saying that the present system is not our model or standard, and that the fatal objection, from our standpoint, to his system is that it is—to say the least—no better than the present. Mr. Shaw is illogical in ignoring our contention that such elements of compulsory taxation as remain under competition are the product of legal privilege and artificially-created inequalities of condition and opportunity.

To meet our case, it is incumbent upon Mr. Shaw to accept the hypothesis of equality of freedom and opportunity. To prevail, he must show that, even under a state of real freedom of competition and real absence of legal monopoly, private enterprise would continue to raise its capital by compulsory taxation, and that labor would have to continue to pay this involuntary tribute. If he cannot prove this, his failure is obvious and complete.

It is to be admitted, however, that indirectly Mr. Shaw does make an attempt to prove his case in the manner indicated. He does intimate—and we know from other writings of his that he certainly believes—that, even under the freest competition and fullest liberty compatible with equality of liberty, private enterprise would involve compulsory levying of tribute. In other words, he believes that private property, owing to his mysterious "economic rent," necessarily results in the exploitation of labor and the supremacy of monopoly. Some years ago Mr. Shaw attempted to demonstrate in his "Impossibilities of Anarchism" that the solution of the social problem advocated by Liberty is totally unscientific, because it ignores the factor of "economic rent." According to Mr. Shaw, the trouble to-day is, not that labor is robbed by monopoly and legal privilege, but that the principle of private property itself is incompatible with industrial equality and justice.

Now, although Mr. Shaw very cavalierly dismisses "most Anarchists" as persons congenitally incapable of grasping "economic rent" (thereby reminding me of the "valiant and loud-voiced corporal in command of two full privates who, falling in with a regiment of the enemy in the dark, orders it to surrender under pain of instant annihilation by his force" of whom Huxley speaks in an article on Harrison's positivistic pretensions), I venture to assure him that he permits himself to lose sight of the difference between comprehension and agreement. We understand his "rent" argument "excellently well," but we perceive little force in it. This is not the place to enter upon a refutation of Mr. Shaw's elaborate "rent" argument, but I may point out the obvious fact that the monopolies of land, credit, and trade have *something* to do with the poverty of the masses, and that their removal would have *some* effect in the direction of greater equality and security. Whether equal liberty would produce all that we expect from it, it is certain that it would effect *some* improvement in the situation, since, even if we admit that private property necessarily entails inequality, it is plain that private property plus legal monopoly and privilege must tend to produce greater inequality and more extreme injustice. Yet, if this is admitted, as it must be, it inevitably follows that under equal freedom capital would not bear so hardly on labor as it does to-day, and "compulsory taxation" would be considerably reduced. If I prove, then, that there would be less compulsory taxation under equal freedom than under the present State, my case is made out, and Mr. Shaw's argument is disposed of.

Diminution of evil is the next best thing to elimination, and, if I show that a change from the present (which, we all agree, is unsatisfactory) in the direction of equal freedom would be a beneficial change, Mr. Shaw can no longer content himself with arguing that *some* compulsory taxation would still remain. The question having become one of quantity, he is bound to show that there would be *less* compulsion under his plan than under mine.

With all cheerfulness, therefore, do I accept Mr. Shaw's generous offer to put the municipality on an equal footing with private enterprise, but not, be it distinctly understood, with the private enterprise of to-day, which is, in reality, private monopoly backed by legal force, but with private enterprise qualified only by equality of freedom and opportunity in the Anarchistic sense. I do *not* admit that, given this equal footing of the municipality and private enterprise, the readjustment would have to be in fa[illegible] of public enterprise. On the contrary, I em[illegible]ically assert that the advantages would be all on the other side.

Mr. Shaw tries to show that a private capitalist who has earned his money in the sweat of his brow has no more power or freedom with respect to the selection of a suitable investment than the taxpayer has with respect to the determination of the public expenditure. The private capitalist can withdraw his funds from one set of directors or organizers and entrust them to another set, but he cannot emancipate himself from these organizers and promoters and directors of big corporations. The taxpayer can transfer his vote from one party to another, but he cannot emancipate himself from all parties. This parallelism is wholly superficial, and overlooks most fundamental and important differences. The taxpayer's money will be collected by force and spent by one political party or other, no matter what he says and does. Even if he declines to vote at all, his consent will be "presumed," and his liberty and property disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the majority of his neighbors. Even Mr. Shaw cannot deny that this is compulsory taxation and government in its most extreme, arrogant, and offensive form. The man may be one of the most inoffensive, gentle, and just fellows in the world; he may ask nothing from his neighbors except that they let him alone. Yet will they tax him and forcibly collect this tax whenever it pleases them to build churches, municipal theatres, baths, schools, libraries, and what not. That this man is a slave of the majority and has no more liberty or property than they graciously suffer him to enjoy is perfectly clear to any one whose mind is not hopelessly entangled in metaphysical cobwebs. Now take, on the other hand, the position of the private capitalist. There are hundreds of industries and occupations into which he can enter. He is not obliged to become a member of a big corporation; there are plenty of small trades and industries open to a man with a little capital. But, even if he is obliged to join some big company, the compulsion, under our hypothesis, is a natural, not a legal, one. We have assumed a state of equal liberty, and under such a state successful corporations survive and conquer by virtue of special fitness for the task undertaken. Hence to join these is to be more certain of commercial success, and it is really absurd to pretend that a man is not free because he naturally prefers to avoid risks and coöperate with those who are most successful and prosperous. But I am willing to waive all considerations of this character, and emphasize but one difference between the two kinds of compulsion. The capitalist who must choose one of several huge combinations in control of the field is obeying a natural necessity. No physical force is used to force him into any of these. He can stay out and try other things. He is not threatened with jail or any other kind of violence. The taxpayer, on the other hand, must part with his earnings under pain of legal violence. If he does not do as he is commanded, jail awaits him, or, at least, forcible expropriation. Only mental confusion and congenital incapacity to see things in their true light can prevent a man from perceiving the radical difference between these two forms of compulsion. I have frequently heard this "compulsion" argument advanced by half-baked metaphysicians, but I never dreamed a man of Mr. Shaw's acuteness would be driven to this pitiable logical expedient.

As for Mr. Shaw's remark that public capital cannot, like private capital, be riotously wasted or gambled away, I am tempted to ask: "Where has Mr. Shaw lived? What has he

seen or read? What does he know?" Public capital *is* gambled away, stolen, wasted every day. Has he never heard of legislative and municipal corruption, extravagance, mismanagement, and inefficiency? Or is he satisfied with the mere fact that the public funds are *supposed* to be applied to useful purposes in economical ways?

Besides, I really fail to see what business it is of Mr. Shaw's that private capital is gambled away or wasted on luxuries. Nobody suffers from such waste except those who are guilty of these vices and their immediate dependents; and, if Mr. Shaw did not choose to interest himself in their fate, no one would force him to do so under a condition of freedom.

I have taken up so much space with the first half of Mr. Shaw's reply that I must stop now, and deal with the second half in another article.

V. Y.

Beauties of Democracy.

We are evidently to have a campaign of hysteria, gush, raving, and insanity. The worst offenders are the gold-bugs, as might have been expected. Their riotous contempt for elementary truths of democratic philosophy would be simply amazing, did we not know *a priori* that the plutocrats are ardent believers in popular government only when such government is successfully manipulated in their own interests. The silver Democrats are assailed as revolutionists, secessionists, and repudiationists because they propose to enact, in a perfectly constitutional and regular way, certain legislation which the plutocracy does not relish.

The London "Spectator," a loyal champion of class rule and privilege, declares that the southern and western States have revolted against property, and that democratic government itself is now on trial in the United States. The New York "Tribune" declares that the Chicago convention has revolted against interest and the due reward of capital. The more reckless hirelings of monopoly do not stop to specify the crimes of the silverites, but denouce them on general principles as enemies of civilization and humanity,—at least, that is all that can be gathered from their incoherrnt and furious outgivings. Let us see what ground there is for their wholesale accusations.

Silver is the principal issue of the present campaign. The simple and notorious fact is that the people detest the gold standard (as they understand it and as it is taught by the gold-bugs), and would welcome with the wildest delight the restoration of the system which prevailed prior to "the crime of 1873." No party has dared to commit itself to gold monometallism, and most of the politicians have always been and now are "international bimetallists." The Republicans have declared for the gold standard as a mere makeshift, as a lesser evil, as something preferable to silver monometallism, and have pledged themselves to promote, in every possible way, the movement for international bimetallism. The Democratic convention has declared for exactly the same general policy as the Republican, with this difference,—that the United States should not wait for the action of other nations, but should proceed to establish bimetallism for itself. The Democrats, therefore, are bimetallists who believe that no international agreement is requisite to insure the success of free coinage in the United States. They may be wrong in this belief; the gold men may be right in asserting that free coinage of gold and silver by a single country would result, not in bimetallism, but in silver monometallism; but it is clear that the difference is a theoretical or intellectual one purely, and that there is absolutely no occasion for any excitement. If these pretended believers in popular government really had faith in their system, and thought the people fit for "self-rule," they would perceive at once that the issue is an economic one, to be discussed calmly and scientifically. What has the belief in the ability of the United States to maintain bimetallism to do with secession, revolution, and repudiation? Where is the revolt against property and interest?

So far, then, as the silver question is concerned, the talk of secession and revolution must be dismissed with absolute disgust as the ravings of senseless and desperate bigots; but the charge of repudiation requires a word or two.

In the first place, with regard to the great burden of debt contracted prior to 1873, restoration of free coinage would clearly be entirely just. It is those who insist on being paid in dearer money who are guilty of repudiating their contract. As for debts recently contracted, even assuming that gold would go out of circulation and the silver dollars would be worth only fifty-three cents in commodities,—one of the very things strenuously denied by the silver people,—the repudiation involved would not be a proper ground of complaint. Congress is empowered under democracy to legislate at all times on financial matters, in accordance with its own views of the greatest good of the greatest number, and, if it sees fit to alter the monetary arrangements of the country in the interest of the greatest number, those who suffer from the change are estopped from protesting. Congress can enact protective laws and repeal them; it can impose internal revenue taxes and take them off. The effect of these changes on the business interests of individuals does not concern it. It acts in the interest of the majority. Whatever it does in pursuance of this authority conferred by the majority is binding, until a new majority succeeds in undoing it. This is democracy; this is majority government. Hence, all contracts, all financial transactions, that have been entered into under the existing standard must be deemed to have had the implied condition subsequent that the parties are not to be held responsible for legislative changes. Under a system which contemplates and involves perpetual changes in national laws, it is absurd for a minority to cry out when a certain change is proposed which affects them injuriously. That great and wonderful means of political control, the ballot, which is always warmly recommended to labor, is at the disposal of these gentry; but, if they are overruled, it is their duty to submit with the most cheerful air.

If the hysterical accusations are not warranted by the monetary plank of the platform, it is still more plain that the rest of the platform absolutely furnishes no decent pretext for them. There are certain reflections on the august supreme court, but since when has that body been above criticism? The less the plutocrats say about the income tax decision, the better. The fact that, by reversing himself in a few weeks, one judge caused a reversal of an unbroken line of decisions in favor of an income tax will scarcely be accepted as conclusively settling the question in the eyes of those who believe in the justice of an income tax.

The austere moralists and solemn philosophers who talk about the fate of democracy and humanity itself hanging in the balance in consequence of the course of the Democratic majority are either miserable hypocrites or narrow-minded and short-sighted students of their political system. Of course this arbitrary upsetting of standards and values, this interference with economic laws, this violation of private contracts, are wrong, absurd, suicidal; but they are of the very essence of democratic government. These things are being done constantly and perpetually, without exciting the virtuous indignation of the plutocrats and beneficiaries of privilege. Only when their own medicine is forced down their throat do they discover that "democracy is on trial." Democracy has been on trial all these years, and intelligent men are gradually becoming inclined to pass an adverse verdict upon it; but the only exceptional and extraordinary feature of the present situation is the predominance of the factors that are usually held in check by the cunning minority. While the progressive man with clear ideas and healthy sentiments cannot congratulate himself upon the turn things have taken, and while the outlook is by no means favorable to liberty and equity, the predicament of the plutocratic brotherhood cannot but be contemplated with considerable satisfaction.

V. Y.

Mr. Atkinson's contribution on finance to the July number of the "Engineering Magazine" must be extremely disappointing to its editor. He doubtless expected a radical and refreshing utterance, a bold challenge to timid conservatism, and a solution going to the root of the difficulty. Instead, he gets a commonplace piece of statistical writing, and the very original recommendation that the government's remedies should be increased by a change in the tariff law! This is precisely what the fanatical Republicans have been saying, and to publish this great discovery as an enlightening contribution to the financial discussion of the day is an incongruity which must have caused Mr. Dunlap no little chagrin. Why does he not ask some one who really has sound and radical views on finance to write a review of the situation for him? There is Bilgram, an engineer and manufacturer of considerable eminence in the technical world, to whom Mr. Dunlap's readers would certainly turn with respect and interest.

Now that the platforms and candidates of the two great parties are known, we are told that a veritable "campaign of education" will begin, and that the whole country will be turned into a great debating society for the discussion of the money question. The trouble is, however, that the teachers and educators are just as ignorant as those whom they undertake to enlighten. If they know more things, they are generally "things that ain't so." Nothing is more impudent and ludicrous than the great

parade of superior intelligence made by the gold-basis and hard-money men. Their assertions and assumptions are infinitely more absurd than the notions of the silver people. The pseudo-argumentation of the gold advocates is self-contradictory, shallow, and puerile. And it is these ignoramuses who denounce the silverites as idiots, fools, and cranks. Fine campaign of education is to be expected from them.

"Fling out the flag," yells the New York "Tribune"; this is another secession struggle, and the sound-money men should show that they stand for national unity and honor. It is to be hoped that its advice will be followed, and that the gold gentry will thus lay themselves open to that most fatal form of attack,—ridicule. Americans are not without humor, and the pretence that the opposition to free coinage of silver is tantamount to defending the flag, and that the millions of farmers and workmen in the west and south who are for silver are traitors and secessionists, is certain to overwhelm its upholders with contempt and laughter. Consider the situation: millions of loyal American citizens want congress to legislate in a certain way, and go about executing their will in the traditional and approved political methods. They believe in majority rule, and ask their adversaries to abide by the decision of the majority. For this they are denounced as revolutionists and secessionists. Have organs like the "Tribune" lost their heads? It is the gold faction which tramples upon the flag and incites rebellion against American government. It is they who decline to submit to majority government. They are the real traitors and repudiators and revolutionists.

The present campaign has already developed many amusing features. For months the gold organs have been loftily contemptuous in their comments on the "ignorance" of those who believed in silver, and they have been expressing the most absolute confidence in the soundness and wisdom of the "business community." Of what consequence is it, pray, what a lot of boors and illiterates think about money, when business men are practically a unit on the question of the necessity of crushing silver? Now, almost the first result of the Chicago nomination has been the astonishing (to the gold press) discovery that no class is more densely ignorant on the subject of finance than the business class. The leading newspapers of every city have been receiving letters from merchants and brokers asking what "sixteen to one" meant and what free coinage really involved. The very people, then, who were to make short work of the silver crusade are the people found to be most ignorant of what all this trouble is about, and who require the first attention of the "educators." Possibly this discovery accounts for the changed tone of the gold press. The bulwark of sound money has collapsed; the flower of the gold army is unprepared and demoralized. The dismay and despair of the organs of Wall street may be easily imagined.

There has been strange reticence lately among conservative philosophers with reference to the "reaction" in favor of religion, order, Tory morality, etc. The utter collapse of the Tory policy in parliament, the inability of the ministry to pass the reactionary legislation, notwithstanding its huge majority, and the blundering diplomacy of Mr. Chamberlain have so discredited the Conservative party that already there is talk of a wave of popular revolt. Coupled with this, there is the remarkable upheaval in Canada,—the overwhelming defeat of the loyalists, protectionists, and religionists, and the triumph of the Liberals who favor free trade and who are suspected of disloyalty to Great Britain. What has become of the learned explanations of the great "reaction"? Even our Positivist philosopher, Frederic Harrison, who saw no way out except in universal conversion to the Religion of Humanity, must find considerable difficulty in reconciling the late political happenings with his peculiar theory.

The Germans have been described as a nation of individualists. Certain is it that they have given the world two of the greatest teachers of individualism,—Stirner and Nietzsche. But it is also true that, as compared with Social Democracy, there has not been, until very recently, any striking popular manifestation of individualistic thought and sentiment in Germany. For a time our friend, John Henry Mackay, was its only champion. Within the immediate past, however,—that is, since the abrogation of the exceptional laws against the Social Democrats,—a change has come over the scene. If the opposition to the prevailing order of things was, until lately, almost wholly confined to Social Democracy, there is now plainly visible the rise of an Anarchistic opposition. This opposition may not as yet be as consistently individualistic as one could wish, but there is no doubt about the direction in which it is moving. One need only look through the columns of "Der Sozialist" and "Der Eigene," the former a weekly, and the latter a fortnightly, published at Berlin, to note the new spirit which is spreading in Germany. In "Der Sozialist," as the name implies, the sociological side of the question is chiefly treated, while in "Der Eigene" (a name adopted from Stirner) the philosophy of egoism is placed in the foreground. Liberty warmly welcomes both papers, and hopes from time to time to have more to say about them and their work.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, Stephen T. Byington, 145 Easth 18th street, New York City.

Note change in secretary's address.

Target, section A.—The following is from the Wilmington, Del., "Star" of July 26:

A reader of the "Star" has requested us to explain for his benefit, and for the benefit of others, the difference between an Anarchist, a Socialist, and a Populist. Perhaps the answer to this question can be best found in a brief statement of three systems of social economy represented by the three classes referred to.

In the first place, let us say that an Anarchist, in the popular sense, is one who seeks to overturn, by violence, all constituted forms and institutions of society and government, all law and order, and all right of property, with no purpose of establishing any other system of order in the place of that destroyed. This is the popular idea, but it is not the true one as to that school of philosophers who are generally classed as Anarchists. Properly speaking, then, and answering the question of our inquirer in the spirit in which he asks it, an Anarchist is one who advocates the absence of government, not from any evil design, but as the true political ideal. Anarchists seek the establishment of a social theory which regards the union of order with the absence of all direct government of man by man as the best possible condition of humanity. Absolute individual liberty is their creed. The most noted expounder of this theory was Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), whose views have been adopted with various modifications by many agitators. His complete works may be had at the Wilmington Institute Free Library. Proudhon contended that the true form of the State is Anarchy, meaning by Anarchy, of course, not positive disorder, but the absence of any human ruler, whether king, president, governor, or convention.

Congratulate the editor of the "Star" on his correctness, and add further developments of the Anarchistic theory.

Section B.—The "Western Watchman," Eureka, Cal., prints this in an article on the Labor Exchange:

The Labor Exchange is a non-political institution. It takes the ground that politics has always been made use of to enslave the people rather than to help them. We do not say but there are many well meaning politicians. In fact, we believe there are many such. What we do believe is that the great ruling power behind the whole system of politics promotes it for the purposes of thwarting the liberties of the people rather than promoting them, and that they have always succeeded in their purpose.

It does not follow from this view of the case that all progress is prevented by politics, but that progress which could not possibly be absolutely prevented has been very greatly hindered, and that it has prevented the employment of a far more efficient means of national development.

There was scarcely ever a greater enemy to the human race than the average politician, and the people are at last coming to regard them as such. Our congressional and legislative sessions are no longer looked to for good work, but dreaded for their evil work.

The Labor Exchange does not agree that this is simply the abuse of a good thing, but that politics is not a wisely-selected method of remedying the ills of the people.

It takes the ground that business is a more fundamental institution than politics; that business is a natural thing, whereas politics is an artificial thing; and that therefore to try to regulate business by political methods is like commencing at the top to build a house.

Intelligent minorities must always introduce and promote economic reforms, and not ignorant majorities. Let the conditions of our country to-day testify to the folly of depending upon politics for the defence and promotion of the welfare of the people. No people ever confided more implicitly in political leaders, and no people ever had so great national prospects spoiled in so short a time. No nation on the earth ever had such an opportunity, and none ever fell so far short of realizing its anticipations.

It is the money power that institutes and operates our political systems for their interests rather than the interests of the people. This statement is also becoming more and more manifest. Since the people have begun to do a little thinking for themselves, whom do they find running the politics of the country?—the money power.

Now, if the people had from the start confided less in politics, and had given their energies to the introduction and promotion of a rational business system, they would long ago have discovered their greatest enemy, and would never have allowed the money power to have carried its system of brigandage to the point of absorbing all the wealth of the world, and enslaved all the people. If the simple facts had been recognized and adhered to that human necessities constitute the basis of business life, and that therefore the sum total of legitimate business life consists simply in the production and exchange of useful commodities, it would have indicated so plainly the true and only purpose of a medium of exchange as would have made it impossible to have subverted it to be the tool of oppression, as has been the case.

Show that we need not only to cease depending on politics, but also to get rid of the political system.

Stephen T. Byington.

The Vanderbilt-Whitney Tie-Up.

No such wedding before
Was e'en among fairies:
And may be no more,
'Less Steve Brodie remarries.

Charles E. Nichols.

Mr. Yarros's Further Criticisms.

I regret that circumstances have caused me to delay so long the few comments I have to make on Mr. Yarros's reply to my "defence," and I will at once take up the points, *seriatim*, that seem important.

I.

I can by no means accept Mr. Yarros's statement of my position,—*e. g.*, that Anarchy "is synonymous with equal liberty." I can conceive an ideal order of things in which Anarchy would be synonymous with equal liberty, but I think that Anarchy now would mean most unequal liberty. For by Anarchy I mean simply the absence of government,—*i. e.*, of a (possibly) coercive organization of society, such as I understand the State to be. Voluntary organizations to punish or prevent crime would be possible under such a system, and I gave instances to that effect (see pp. 17-21, "Anarchy or Government?", *cf.* pp. 69-73), which, I may say by the way, show that I was not fighting a windmill such as Tolstoi offers for our admiration. But an organization that every member of a society was obliged to support, willy-nilly, would be the antithesis of Anarchy. Yet I believe that only by such an organization would anything like equal liberty be secured among all the inhabitants of the territory covered by a society. Doubtless the equal liberty of *some* would be maintained by private agencies, but the critical question, from the social point of view, is always whether, in any given particular, the interests of all the members of the society are subserved: and I doubt if this can be, so long as the inequalities between men are what they are and as some are willing to take advantage of their fellows, save by an organization that in its nature includes all and that binds all.

Such a doubt rests, of course, upon experience (real or supposed), and Mr. Stephen T. Byington asks what are the facts that support it, and whether I have "specified" them in my book? I have not specified them, but I have referred to them (see, for example, pp. 16, 17, 72, 73, and 156, 157). Perhaps I cannot do better than cite one passage:

> We think government indispensable for the protection of life and property. But people may protect themselves, and those who cannot may contract with those stronger than they to protect them. In early times, when violence was rife, the custom was, says M. Leroy-Beaulieu, to place one's self under the protection of "some brigand rather more honest than the rest," and make a bargain with him. The great men of Greek antiquity, and of almost every other antiquity, were, he adds, "professed brigands punctual in their performance and faithful to their word." So, as is well known, in the middle ages, when government was weak or non-existent, small proprietors of freeholds placed themselves under the patronage of powerful lords, and became by choice their vassals, or even their serfs (pp. 16, 17).

The period I had particularly in mind was the feudal period in European history, though I think the same thing is true of a feudal order of society anywhere. As I understand the matter (though I do not pretend to be anything of a historical scholar), and as Sir Frederic Pollock expressly says in his "History of Politics": "The mediæval system of Europe was not a system of States in our sense or in the Greek sense." He goes on: "It was a collection of groups held together in the first instance by ties of personal dependence and allegiance, and connected among themselves by personal relations of the same kind on a magnified scale." So Sir Henry S. Maine says in his "Ancient Law":

> The tie which united them [the earliest feudal communities] was a contract, and they obtained new associates by contracting with them. The relation of the lord to the vassals had originally been settled by express engagement, and a person wishing to engraft himself in the brotherhood by commendation or infeudation came to a distinct understanding as to the conditions on which he was to be admitted. It is, therefore, the sphere occupied in them by contract which principally distinguishes the feudal institutions from the unadulterated usages of primitive races.

That is to say, in the mediæval period a man on the territory of what is now called France or England or Germany or Spain did not have protection of his life and property by virtue of his membership in a society coextensive with that territory, but he got it either by using his own arms and weapons of defence or by contracting with some one more powerful than he to provide it, in exchange for certain services which he agreed to render him. The society did little or nothing for him; it scarcely existed (in a political form); the individual was thrown upon himself and such arrangements as he might voluntarily contrive. In such circumstances, lords and vassals arise with entire naturalness, just as they do in our largely anarchic industrial order of the present day. The lords were the strong, commanding personalities, the vassals the weaker who attached themselves to them. Both classes rendered services to one another. The lord protected, the vassal served. It was much as with our large employers and their workingmen now.

Yet will any one say that the feudal order of society was satisfactory? The fact is it began to be intolerable in France and England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the people allied themselves with absolute monarchs to get rid of it. Men awoke to the fact that they had freely sold themselves into something like slavery, just as workingmen are beginning to realize now that their freedom of contract is a largely nominal affair. The tendency had worked itself out to which Sir James Fitzjames Stephen alludes when he says that, "if human experience proves anything at all, it proves that, if restraints are minimized, if the largest possible measure of liberty is accorded to all human beings, the result will not be equality, but inequality, reproducing itself in a geometrical ratio." ("Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.") It is but a more detailed statement of the logic of this tendency, when Professor Burgess says:

> Deprive the State, either wholly or in part, of the power to determine the elements and the scope of individual liberty, and the result must be that each individual will make such determination, wholly or in part, for himself; that the determinations of different individuals will come into conflict with each other; and that those individuals only who have power to help themselves will remain free, reducing the rest to personal subjection." ("Political Science and Constitutional Law.")

True, the lords and vassals had bargained or contracted; but one class generally, if not invariably, got the better of the bargain. Among savages, as, for instance, among the Bushmen, the weaker, "if he would preserve his own life, is obliged to resign to the stronger his weapons, his wife, and even his children." (Spencer's "Sociology.") The mediæval lords, owing to Christianity and other influences of a former civilization, were not quite so exacting, but they demanded all that in conscience they could, and more than the consciences of the vassals approved. Hence the only remedy for the vassals was in confronting the lords with a power more powerful than they, and this was found in the so-called absolute monarch (*e. g.*, Henry VII. in England), backed by their own support and making the country or nation for the first time a real political unity. Professor Burgess says: "The absolute monarchies of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries . . . gave liberty to the common man at the same time that they subjected the nobles to the law of the State. In fact, they gave liberty to the common man by subjecting the nobles to the law of the State." ("Political Science and Constitutional Law.") That is, liberty (in the enjoyment of life and property) was *achieved by* the State, and it is difficult to see how, under the then existing circumstances, it could have been won in any other way. Liberty for the peasant could be got only by abridging the liberty of the noble, and to do this a power stronger than the noble had to assert itself.

Doubtless the alliance of absolute monarchy with the people is a temporary phenomenon. It easily degenerates into despotism; it belongs at best to an immature period of society; for, when the people become of age, they can, by democratic methods, accomplish for themselves all that a monarch could for them. But it is of interest to note that in one respect there has always been a certain affinity between the kingship and the mass of the people. It was so among the Romans, among the Greeks,—of which Coulange's "La Cité Antique" gives many instances,—and among the ancient Semites. The reason of it was not so much that the people loved rule as that they found monarchy the only means of deliverance from the worst sort of rule,—that of an irresponsible aristocracy. The late Professor Robertson Smith's admirable sociological study, called the "Religion of the Semites," contains the following interesting passage, which will make clear what I mean:

> Now, it is a matter of constant observation in early history that the primitive equality of the tribal system tends, in progress of time, to transform itself into an aristocracy of the more powerful kins, or of the more powerful families within one kin. That is, the smaller and weaker kins are content to place themselves in a position of dependence on their more powerful neighbors, in order to secure their protection; or even within one and the same kin men begin to distinguish between their nearer and more distant cousins, and, as wealth begins to be unequally distributed, the great man's distant and poor relation has to be content with a distant and supercilious patronage, and sinks into a position of inferiority. The kingship is the one social force that works against this tendency, for it is the king's interest to maintain a balance of power, and prevent the excessive aggrandizement of noble families that might compete with his own authority. Thus, even for selfish reasons, the sovereign is more and more brought into the position of the champion of the weak against the strong, of the masses against the aristocracy.

Professor Smith even gives a naturalistic explanation of the rise of so-called "ethical monotheism" among the Semites that is highly interesting both from our present and from the religious point of view. The ethical monotheism, of which the Hebrew prophets were so distinguished representatives, was in the main, he says, "nothing more than the consequence of the alliance of religion with monarchy." He continues:

> For, however corrupt the actual kingships of the East became, *the ideal of the kingship as a source of even-handed justice throughout the whole nation, without respect of persons, was higher than the ideal of the aristocracy*, in which each noble is expected to favor his own family, even at the expense of the State or of justice; and it is on the ideal, rather than on the actual, that religious conceptions are based, if not in ordinary minds, at least in the minds of more thoughtful and pious men. [The italics are mine.]

Somewhere in the "Social Contract" Rousseau sums up the whole philosophy and history of the matter in a passage which I regret I can quote only from memory, to the effect that, because the natural tendency of things is toward inequality, therefore government is necessary to correct the tendency and promote equality, as far as may be possible.

II.

Secondly, as to the justice of Anarchy. Mr. Yarros says "it is necessary to determine only whether Anarchy is just," and that I, as "an ethical leader," must assent to this proposition. Now, the best I can say is that Anarchy *may be* just; that there is nothing in the theory, if the right sort of individuals are forthcoming, that is against justice. Indeed, I say just the same of government. From the social point of view there is no injustice in government. Both Anarchy and government are the methods by which social ends may be attained. Neither works well necessarily. Actual government may be a farce and an iniquity,—has been at times. Government and Anarchy, too, may coexist in relation to different sorts of interests—as at the present time in America we have practical Anarchy in the realm of religion, and yet government in the protection of life and property. That of the two methods is best which, in relation to a particular sort of interests, produces the most and the most widely and evenly distributed happiness and welfare.

III.

I am happy to find Mr. Yarros agreeing, a little later in his first article, to the idea that "right and wrong are measured by the welfare of the tribe or community," and resting his contention for Anarchy on the claim that it serves social well-being better. This is solid ground to stand on, while his argument about first settling the justice of Anarchy, as if expediency necessarily followed, seems to me confused. Consistently with this position, he would, I suppose, admit that, if it turned out that government was more advantageous to the community, it would thereby be justified, whatever might be said about liberty; and certainly I, if I could be persuaded that the rights of all, including the weak and defenceless, would be secured by private agency and voluntary association, would consider Anarchy justified. If my inference is correct, Mr. Yarros and I differ in judgment (relative to facts), but not in principle.

Indeed, Mr. Yarros seems to say expressly that under early militancy government and individual subordination were necessary, and therefore, I suppose, for the time justified. This is all I could ask. Certainly, when militancy passes away, government cannot have this species of justification. But such an admission is at the expense of Mr. Yarros's thorough-going Anarchism. For the thorough-going libertarian would say that voluntary action and association would have served social ends in a period of militancy as truly as in any other stage of evolution; and this possibility I considered in my book.

In a later paragraph, Mr. Yarros does, indeed, make the paradoxical assertion: "Yes, we do affirm that the individual has the right to do with himself as he pleases, irrespective of the welfare of others"; but he plainly means by "others," "others individually" or "some others," not the society—for he says that the society which recognizes this right becomes, under present industrial conditions, the fittest and the one most certain to survive. But this is not what I meant by "others," when I said that it had been reserved to the philosophical Anarchists to discover the "abstract absolute right of the individual to do with himself as he pleases, irrespective of the welfare of others about him." I meant by "others" others in general, whether individually or as a social body. I had supposed philosophical Anarchists put individual rights above social rights; that they believed in individual sovereignty, and were opposed to social sovereignty; in brief, that they made liberty a principle. But it appears that Mr. Yarros does not do this, and perhaps I am mistaken about philosophical Anarchists in general. And yet a consequence follows from Mr. Yarros's method of contending for the right of the individual to do as he pleases irrespective of the welfare of (certain) others on the ground that this will promote social efficiency and certainty of survival in the struggle for existence: namely, that, if the exercise of this individualism tends to weaken and disrupt a society, producing classes and enmities and private war,—that is, if it have the contrary effect from what Mr. Yarros supposes, and causes the society to go down in the struggle for existence,—then such individualism would be condemned, and all the abstract idealizing about liberty would lose its force. If Mr. Yarros admits this, again I have no difference of principle with him. It is a question of fact.

IV.

Possibly I am inconsistent in my admission about the Quakers. Let us see. I say a man should not be forced against his conscience. If philosophical Anarchists feel that it is a sin to pay taxes, I do not think they ought to be forced to pay them. I do not say, "if they prefer not to pay them," or "if they entertain a theory that society would go on better without compulsory provisions of this sort," but, if they have a living, positive, personal conviction that it is a sin to pay them, just as Quakers feel that war is a sin. I do not think that this is inconsistent with the recognition of the social origin of the moral sentiments or with social tests of right and wrong; for I do not know of anything more intimately bound up with the welfare of society than conscience, even if in individual instances it goes wrong. To compel to what the individual feels to be wrong-doing is to kill the goose that hatches the golden egg. At bottom society is held together by moral bonds. Force is properly exercised only against those who have something of the social conscience, but have not the social will (*i. e.*, apart from those who have no conscience at all). To violate conscience itself is suicidal for a State.

V.

In passing, I may make a comment on Mr. Tucker's turning on Mr. Yarros with the question, "Isn't it preposterous to plead equal liberty when the very existence of the community is at stake?" Inasmuch as Mr. Tucker has said at the beginning of his article that "the welfare of the tribe or community" means little or nothing as a basis of ethics, and means little or nothing in this way because it means little or nothing anyway, being an utterly vague conception, I am at a loss to know what his question to Mr. Yarros means. Is "the existence of the community" then a standard or end to him? If so, then he grants a tolerably objective standard of right, after all. And, in the name of this standard, he is willing, under certain circumstances, to throw equal liberty to the winds. Which, then, is the sovereign conception, the community or individual liberty? Even Mr. Yarros says that society "is a scientific abstraction; there are only individuals"; and presumably Mr. Tucker agrees with him. Yet Mr. Tucker justifies sacrificing individuals—their liberties and, I suppose, their lives—to society. And society is "an abstraction" . . . It is hard to see the logic of sacrificing flesh and blood for a shadow. The fact is men never have sacrificed themselves in this way. The city among the ancient Greeks, the tribe among more primitive peoples, was a living, concrete reality; if anything was shadowy, it was men's own individual lives in comparison with it.

Mr. Yarros says: "To ask any number of individuals to sacrifice themselves for 'society'—that is, for the rest of the membership—is to deprive them of every motive for wishing to lead a social life." How is it, then, that individuals have so sacrificed themselves in the past, and have sometimes felt that they reached the summit of their existence in risking such a result? How is it that Mr. Tucker can expect them to do so? How is it that Mr. Yarros himself, in another connection, appears to justify them for doing so? Is it the sanity of these individuals that we are to consider at fault, or the tenuity of Mr. Yarros's logic?

So far as suicide is concerned, if anybody feels that he *ought* to commit suicide (if such a feeling is possible), I do not think society has any right to interfere with him; but, if one is tempted this way simply by despair, disgust with life, or any of the ordinary motives, I think society has a perfect right to hinder the act, if it needs the individual,—though in this case it is surely bound to make life worth living for the individual, and, if it does not, it has no further claim on him. There are not only rights, but duties of society; and it may forfeit its rights by a nonperformance of its duties.

VI.

As to how a majority or any powerful single influence can represent a society, I argued that, in the absence of unanimity among the members, it was the only way in which a society could act. A society might be denied the right to act (when all its members were not agreed), but, if it is conceded the right, then it must act as best it can, and majority rule, or, at least, some strong single influence equivalent to a majority, may be the only means whereby action can be effected. (Mr. Yarros devotes a paragraph to my supposed claim that the "only method" by which society can act is majority rule; but I said in the paragraph he himself quotes, "majority rule, *or at least some strong single thought or emotion that is equivalent to a majority.*") Mr. Yarros not only denies that a society may (has the right to) act in such circumstances, but says that it *cannot* act. I suppose then he holds that congress cannot act when it passes bills against which votes are given, or that a town meeting cannot decide to lay out a road because there are some protests against it, or that any private business association cannot act unless every one of its members (or at least directors) agree to a certain line of policy that may be in question. Only the majority act in such cases, Mr. Yarros seems to say,—not congress, or the town, or the business association. But the fact is, as everybody knows, that these bodies do act, and act as truly as if a unanimous agreement were behind their action. Mr. Yarros could just as logically argue that congress and the town and the private association as such do not exist, they being only abstractions and the only realities being the individuals composing them, any of which could unite for any purpose about which they might agree, but none of which could do more than speak for themselves. If my critic takes any comfort in the conclusion that congress and associations of all sorts that run by majority vote are mere names, and that every assumption on the part of the majority in any case to speak for the association is mere arrogant assumption or pretence, I will not disturb him in it. To me it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of thorough-going individualist philosophy.

Mr. Yarros thinks that, in taking an illustration of social action from the individual, who sometimes has contrary impulses, I am at fault in my psychology. But here again he interprets me with too much literalness. It is quite true, as he says, that, so long as the feelings are at war, there is no action, and that only when one feeling, or group of feelings, gains predominance is action the result. But, if strictly there is but one feeling or group of feelings, how can we speak of "predominance?" Does not this imply one feeling holding another in subjection? If so, the latter cannot be absolutely denied existence. A suppressed emotion or appetite is still in some sense a reality; its physiological counterpart is probably quite different from what the counterpart of the contrasted state of emotion or appetite would be. When we are thirsty, we may yet refuse to drink,—that is, we may overcome the appetite by some stronger desire: but would any one say that the thirst was not still in some sense a reality? Yet, in whatever sense this was true (if it is true at all), a being with so divided impulses would be a rough parallel to a society with divided minds. Undoubtedly there are the differences in the two cases which Mr. Yarros particularizes; but they do not seem to me to make the illustration for the purposes for which it was intended.

VII.

Mr. Yarros emphasizes considerations in his third article to which I own (and did own in my article) not having given sufficient attention. If, on looking into the matter, I could be convinced that, by giving the laborer liberties he does not now enjoy, such as Mr. Yarros specifies (liberty to use natural media, to exchange products and organize credit, to make his own currency, etc.), the laborer would, as Mr. Yarros thinks, be enabled "to command equitable terms" for his labor without help from society, I should have to recast my chapter on "Anarchy or Government in the Industrial Realm" and adopt different practical conclusions. If Mr. Yarros is right, my argument, of course, fails to go to the bottom of the question. All I can say is that I *will* look into the matter. I own already that "monopoly, legal privilege, and legal inequalities" have had a great deal to do in causing industrial injustice.

VIII.

But, as to bargains being necessarily just that are struck under conditions of equal freedom, I cannot at all see it. I think my critic has hardly faced fairly my problem of the drowning man, but, after what Mr. Tucker has said, I need add nothing. Of course, we can make definitions as we choose, and, if Mr. Yarros or Mr. Spencer chooses to define justice as what takes place under equal freedom, I have no quarrel with him,—though in that case it becomes somewhat superfluous to argue whether equal freedom produces justice. If equal freedom is synonymous with justice, then, of course, a free contract between a drowning man and his rescuer, such as I described before, is just—whether it is to be enforced or not. For my own part, I cannot call it "just," because I associate a different sort of idea with that word. And I think most people do. Indeed, I suspect that in unguarded moments Mr. Yarros and Mr. Tucker themselves do. A primary element in my idea of justice is not taking advantage of another's necessities. To my mind such a free contract as I have described is of the very essence of injustice.

IX.

About one point I am not quite clear. In one or two places Mr. Yarros appears to sanction the idea that the majority in a society has the right to use force to effect equal freedom. Does he really sanction this idea, or am I mistaken? It is rather what his language suggests than any positive assertion that I have in mind, and hence I am in doubt. If he holds that society, or, rather, as he would say, a majority, may enforce equal freedom, is not this a departure from Anarchism pure and simple? Practically is it not equivalent to about such a justification of government as Mr. Spencer would give? And, if a majority is held to have the right to enforce equal freedom on a minority, how is the right derived? Surely, it is not simply because the majority wants to and can,—*i. e.*, the right of might. Yet, if not this, what is the basis? And how will the appearance of tyranny be avoided, which is involved in ever so large a majority enforcing ever so good an abstract moral idea on a

minority? I confess I am unable to see how this appearance can be avoided, save by leaving individualist principles altogether, and taking as one's starting point society. A number of people who agree about equal freedom may form an association of which this shall be the rule, but how, on the principles of voluntaryism and contract, can they enforce this rule on other invasive persons who do not agree to it, supposing, of course, that the objects of invasion are not their own members?

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